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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS
"HOUSER OF LAST RESORT":
A POLICY FOR DEMOCRATIC
URBAN GROWTH
HERBERT M. FRANKLIN*
If efforts to reach the [national housing] goal through the full
participation of private industry should fail, this committee of
practical and experienced men [the Kaiser Committee] concluded
"we would foresee the need for massive federal intervention, with
the federal government becoming the nation's houser of last re-
sort." I agreed and I continue to agree.'
With increasing frequency "national urban growth policy" has been
used to describe various means by which the national government
might affect the nature and pattern of human settlement in the United
States.
The phrase appeared first in the Urban Growth and New Com-
munity Development Act of 1970,2 which lays out a broad framework
for a "national urban growth policy." The Act calls for the issuance
of a biennial Presidential Report on Urban Growth and provides new
incentives for the development of new communities and inner city
areas.
* Vice President, National Urban Coalition, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Harvard,
1955; J.D., Harvard, 1958.
1. LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT 331-32 (1971).
2. Title VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L.
91-609, 84 Stat. 1770 (1971).
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The 1970 statute, in listing the ingredients of a national growth
policy, illustrates the fragmentary way in which quite separate but
related federal policies are now developed and implemented. Con-
gress specified that urban growth policy should:
(1) Encourage wise and balanced use of physical and human re-
sources in metropolitan and urban regions;
(2) Foster economic growth to reverse trends of migration which
reinforce disparities among such regions;
(3) Treat comprehensively the problems of poverty and unemploy-
ment associated with disorderly urbanization and rural decline;
(4) Encourage good housing for all without racial discrimination;
(5) Revitalize existing communities and encourage planned, large-
scale urban new community development;
(6) Strengthen the capacity of general government institutions to
contribute to balanced urban growth;
(7) Facilitate increased coordination in the administration of fed-
eral programs to encourage desirable patterns of urban growth; and
(8) Encourage the prudent use of natural resources and the pro-
tection of the physical environment.
After one year, the state and federal legislative and administrative
initiatives which have addressed themselves to these ingredients com-
prise a veritable kaleidoscope whose mosaic may shift with each
change in overall perspective. Such policies range from highway and
mass transportation programs, increased authorization for TVA, and
reform of landlord-tenant relations to housing and new community
legislation. Even anti-crime legislation might be included in the mix,
because insecurity has a marked impact on the economic decay of
urban areas.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
It may be useful to divide existing national government policies
into two streams for purposes of analyzing their impact on the dis-
tribution of resources and, inevitably, the pattern of human settle-
ment. First is the functional stream of policies, by which resources
are distributed according to economic functions that do not respect
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geographic boundaries within the national economy. For example,
the President's controversial new economic programs comprise policies
that profess neutrality in connection with the development of the
inner city, the rural hinterland, or suburbia.
So it is with virtually every aspect of incomes policy, tax policy,
monetary policy, and other functional programs. If the economy is to
be stimulated by investment credits, such credits can be earned even
by a plant expanding in an exclusionary suburb. The oil depletion
allowance can be earned in Alaska as well as Texas. If social security
benefits are increased, or veterans benefits augmented, the residence
of the recipient is irrelevant. Indeed, the long-pending reform of the
existing welfare program stems from a recognition that disparity in
benefits because of residence is not an equitable or rational policy.
There is a long agenda, exemplified by voting rights and criminal
justice matters, where the different treatment of people resulting from
their residence has become less and less tolerable even in a federal
republic. The pathbreaking 1971 decision of the California Supreme
Court also embraces as legally intolerable an intrastate system of school
finance that penalizes children because they happen to reside in a
jurisdiction with an inadequate real estate tax base.3
A quite separate stream might be called the territorial or area de-
velopmnent policy stream. These policies distribute national resources
by virtue of some territorial objective, usually involving cooperative
action by other levels of government in the federal system. The policy
goals in this stream are usually to enhance the economy of a given
area or group of areas.
Generally, federal resources are transmitted in the second stream
under an application system requiring affirmative action by another
level of government requesting aid from the national agency that
finances the eligible activity. Federal programs to improve the physi-
cal quality of urbanization operate principally in this manner.
The major urban growth problem facing the United States is the
future of its metropolitan areas. By the year 2000 present trends will
concentrate 70 per cent of our population in the twelve largest urban
regions occupying one-tenth of our land area. 4 There are now 76 mil-
lion Americans living in suburban areas, 64 million in central cities,
3. Serrano v. Priest, - Cal. 3d - , 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
4. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL GOALS RESEARCH STAFF, TOWARD BALANCED
GROWTH: QUANTITY WITH QUALITY 186 (1970).
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and only 63 million outside metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas
accounted for more than four-fifths of total national growth in the
past ten years, and they have grown more rapidly than the national
average since 1900. Even were migration into such areas to be reduced
below current levels, experts believe that the proportion of our popu-
lation now living there-about two-thirds-would increase to 70 per
cent by the year 2000, largely through natural increase (internal
births).
II. DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY
The thesis of this article is that federal housing policy discriminates
against people because of residence, and income (and by extension,
race); and the only way to correct this is to develop a "last resort"
direct capability in the federal government to put housing in place.
If the rhetoric of urban growth policy is to have any meaning,
surely it suggests that the national government must assess the impact
of its functional policies on the nature of metropolitan growth and
pursue a more conscious effort to design its area development policies
with demographic trends in mind. It is fair to say that federal hous-
ing programs have generally been designed to stimulate the economy
rather than to affect urban growth patterns.
Proportionally, blacks reside in metropolitan areas more than do
whites (74% to 68%).G But the proportions of the races residing in
central cities and suburbs is very disparate: 80 per cent of the metro-
politan black population lives in central cities, compared to only 40
per cent of the whites. While there was an absolute increase of blacks
in the suburbs, this remains a very small percentage in each metro-
politan area. For cities over 500,000, the white population declined
1.9 million over the decade, while the black population increased by
2.2 million. Blacks as a proportion of central city population increased
from 16 to 21 per cent during the 1960's.
The median income for white families residing in central cities and
suburban rings has shown increasing economic disparity in the last
decade.6 In 1959 median white income in the suburban ring areas
was somewhat higher than in the central cities: $8,486 to $7,881. Ten
years later the gap widened: $11,155 to $9,797. Whereas Negro family
5. Statement of Dr. George H. Brown, Director, Bureau of the Census, before
U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, June 14, 1971.
6. Id.
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median income in 1959 was higher in the central city than in the
suburbs ($4,840 to $4,383), the economic ghettoization of the central
city is now reflected in the figures for Negro families. Those in su-
burban rings had a median income in 1969 of $6,986, while Negro
families in the central city had a median income of only $6,136. Thus,
the central city is increasingly the primary haven of poor whites and
blacks.
The transformation of our urban areas into black and poor central
cities with largely white and affluent suburbs has serious implications
for American society. It is bound to complicate efforts to desegregate
public education, to overcome fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas,
and to achieve necessary cooperation among different local jurisdic-
tions and different levels of government.
Our metropolitan population will not only grow as a proportion of
our total population, but its growth in absolute terms will be stagger-
ing under even conservative projections. It is estimated that to ac-
cominodate the anticipated urban population to the year 2000 would
require building a city the size of Tulsa every month for the rest of
the century.
The level of anticipated growth will put a severe strain on the
existing institutions that allocate our land, housing, and transporta-
tion resources, particularly in connection with growth regarded as
fiscally burdensome, i.e., most forms of residential development.
There is some evidence already that jurisdictions may be strength-
ening their existing land use controls and building regulations in an
effort to thwart growth pressures that require municipal services such
as new schools, sewers, and fire stations. The current concern with
preserving or enhancing the ecological balance of the land may play
into the hands of local preferences to avoid further development for
fiscal rather than ecological reasons.
Environmental groups correctly allege that indiscriminate suburban
sprawl has allowed land use and development that may degrade the
environment. On the other hand, civil rights and development groups
also correctly charge that suburban land use restrictions keep out
lower income housing, maintain a "white noose" around the city, and
hamper the achievement of national housing goals.
Potential conflicts have appeared in some instances. In one case
involving local exclusion of nonprofit housing sponsored by a black
7. See note 4 supra at 56.
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group, the countervailing claims asserted to obstruct the proposed
development were the desire for open space and avoidance of sewer
overload.8 In other instances the maintenance of scenic open space
has been asserted to justify large-lot zoning,9 refusals to rezone for
higher density housing, or other exclusionary techniques.
Studies and census bureau data as well as casual observations indi-
cate that the geographic expansion of metropolitan areas and the shift
of population to the suburbs have been accompanied by a growth of
industrial and business activities outside central cities. Economic
decentralization has progressed at different rates in different metro-
politan areas, but it is a firmly established national trend.
In ten metropolitan areas cited in the President's 1971 Manpower
report, almost 80 per cent of the employment growth in manufactur-
ing in the 1960's took place in suburbs, as did 78 per cent of retail
trade employment growth, and 68 per cent of wholesale trade em-
ployment growth.10 The report also noted that there are records of
journeys to work involving reverse commuting in which disadvantaged
workers spent up to five hours a day traveling by bus, with six trans-
fers, to go to and from jobs paying $2.00 or less an hour. The exclu-
sion of lower-income housing from the suburbs, and the suburban
favoritism of mass transit schedules and routing, contribute to dis-
parities that undermine national manpower policies.
On the other hand, at least one recent study indicates that a re-
spectable absolute rate of job growth has been maintained in the
central cities, with sufficient growth in semi-skilled and low-skilled
jobs to accommodate the unemployed if, in fact, they had access to
those jobs.11
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is reportedly
considering a standard that would make action in conflict with an
egalitarian urban growth policy a predicate for a violation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act.' 2 Pressures have built up to
8. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970).
9. National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 89-90, 96
(1971).
11. C. Fremon, The Occupational Patterns in Urban Employment Change
1965-1967, August 1970 (a paper published by The Urban Institute, 2100 M
Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037).
12. Memorandum, Employment Discrimination by Re-location of Plant and
Corporate Headquarters, Equal Employment Opportunities Comm., July 7, 1971.
See also Washington Post, August 27, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
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use federal facility location as an affirmative tool for shaping metro-
politan growth; new policies adopted by HUD and the General Serv-
ices Administration are intended to respond to these pressures.
13
The extent to which national growth policies encourage a stable
supply of sites for low- and moderate-income housing will determine
the extent to which the production of such housing can fuel economic
growth for peacetime purposes. Sites are limited by a number of
factors, among them economic and racial discrimination against sub-
sidized projects. Such projects are by law and administrative regula-
tion open to minorities. This is generally recognized by the public,
particularly neighbors of the proposed development.
As a consequence of the increased federal involvement in subsidized
housing developments, the concerns of civil rights forces, housing pro-
duction interests, and urban growth analysts converge in the arena of
national housing policy. Spurred by the courts, existing legislation,
and public criticism, the federal government has proposed locational
criteria for allocating its housing subsidies that for the first time pur-
port to redress racial disparities in metropolitan areas.'4 This is being
proposed, however, in the absence of comprehensive data on where
housing subsidies are flowing within such areas, of the racial compo-
sition of housing managed by other than local public housing authori-
ties, and of metropolitan housing plans. Few people, in or out of
government, would now profess to know with precision the "formula"
for dispersing housing opportunities in a metropolitan area.
What programs are included in the urban growth constellation vary
with the observer, but certainly the federal housing programs must be
considered a major element. What the goals of an urban growth pol-
icy might be is also a matter open to varying perspectives, but a major
ingredient in any national goal must be the creation of metropolitan
'open communities," and the avoidance of residential apartheid.
III. NATIONAL AND LOCAL HOUSING RESPONSIBILITIES
If one were to construct, ab initio, a national housing and land
policy in a federal system, questions would immediately arise as to
which level of government ought to perform what role in guiding
13, Memorandum of understanding between the Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development and the General Services Administration concerning law and mod-
erate income housing, June 11, 1971.
14. Project Selection Criteria (Notice of Proposed Rule Making), 36 Fed. Reg.
19316 (1971). These proposed criteria supplant those originally announced in
36 Fed, Reg. 12032 (1971).
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private and public decisions toward appropriate goals. The provision
of housing in the narrow sense-creating and maintaining shelter-is
essentially a private sector decision although it is one of the most reg-
ulated of private industries. If we define housing in its broadest
sense-the creation of a living environment-the decision becomes
more mixed, and both public and private sectors play key roles. Pub-
lic decisions on sewers, streets, or schools are the spine of community
development.
Looking at housing in the narrow sense, quite separate resources of
land, labor, and capital are put together by private mechanisms which
must deal with the direct or indirect forms of public regulation. As
we try to determine on what level public regulation should be or-
ganized, some questions and answers come more readily than others
when we examine the present system.
A. Finance
The availability of construction financing and permanent financing
is a result of monetary and fiscal decisions taken by national or central
government instruments, such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, or the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation. The Treasury itself in selling bonds to finance the operations
of the government profoundly affects the availability of long-term
mortgage credit in the private pool into which it dips along with pri-
vate corporations.
This home financing system is quite complicated, and these central
banking mechanisms exert a pervasive and complex influence on it.
In fiscal year 1970 the national government provided enough funds
through this "system!' to cover 58 per cent of all mortgage loans made
in that period. One knowledgeable observer has predicted the eventual
"federalization of the housing market."15
Current national housing goals call for a federal subsidy of about
one quarter to one-third of housing starts (not including mobile
homes). The direct cost to the U.S. taxpayer, based on subsidy pay-
ments already obligated by the federal government, is estimated at
$30 billion over the next 30 to 40 years.1 6 Assuming the completion
15. Wall Street Journal, January 5, 1971, at 1, col. 6. The prediction was
attributed to Henry Kaufman, partner and economist in a New York investment
house.
16. PRESIDENT'S Tum ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL HOUSING GOALS, H.R.
Doc. No. 92-136, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
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of six million subsidized units for low- and moderate-income families
by 1978, present estimates suggest $7.5 billion annually will be paid
by that year.17
Clearly, the flow of money into housing is a function of decisions
made in a national context; state or local governments play little or
no part. Indeed, the major impediments to more efficient flow of
capital across state lines are the vagaries of state and local law as they
affect mortgage instruments, building codes, and zoning.
Without passing judgment on the effectiveness of current national
instruments, it is worth noting that no one is heard suggesting that
other levels of government ought to, or can, perform the job of allocat-
ing capital for housing finance. We might sooner tolerate trade wars
among the states.
The national government, through the Internal Revenue Code, also
provides enormous stimulus to middle class homeownership at great
loss to the Treasury. In 1970, the allowable deduction of interest on
mortgages of owner-occupied homes was $2.8 billion a year; the de-
ductibility of property taxes by this same group of taxpayers resulted
in an estimated loss of an additional $2.9 billion, or a total of $5.7
billion per year.s Here again, the national government merely facili-
tates the flow of money into a form of property tenure which pro-
foundly if only indirectly affects the shape and character of our metro-
politan areas. In this respect it might be said that the norm for na-
tional policy is simply middle-class homeownership. Although this
subsidized tenure tends to encourage or underwrite wasteful sprawl
by driving up housing costs and raising the loss to the Treasury, it is
currently of no apparent concern.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969,19 however, introduced a new form
of indirect subsidy to housing. It changed the rules regarding depreci-
ation to divert investment from commercial and industrial real estate
to stimulate the development of new residential rental projects in
general and certain federally assisted low- and moderate-income proj-
ects in particular. The loss to the Treasury will undoubtedly be quite
small as compared to the homeownership figures previously cited.
Here again, the effect on the character of the urban environment is
17. Id.
18. Cf. Schorr, National Community and Housing Policy, 39 SOCIAL SERVICE
REv. 433 (1965); GRUEN, GRUEN, & ASSOCIATES, HOUSING POLICY AND CLASS
INTEGRATION.
19. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 167.
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significant, but the tax law is neutral as to whether the benefits accrue
in the inner city or suburbia.
Aside from these macroeconomic policies, the federal government
since 1969 has vastly increased is subsidization of housing for the non-
poor in ways which work in tandem with essentially private mech-
anisms. F-IA insurance and VA guarantees were the backbone of
federal housing policy until 1969. In 1971 it is estimated that 250,000
units will be directly subsidized by the federal government in pro-
grams that were nonexistent until 1969, the FHA 236 and 235 pro-
grams. These units are sponsored by private entities. The home own-
ership assistance program, for example, subsidizes home buyers at $20
per month for up to five years on conventionally financed mortgages
up to $25,000, as administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank and
savings institutions. Under other programs, the federal government
also tries to maintain the FHA-VA interest rate at 7 per cent on mort-
gages from $22,000 to $24,500, and in other circumstances, up to $33,-
000.20
The central point is that many housing subsidies flow through a
functional stream that is totally unconcerned with the nature of urban
patterns, and all these programs are intended to aid the non-poor.
National government intervention in home finance for the non-poor
is thus theoretically untrammeled by the "sovereignty" of other levels
of government. In fact the national policy favoring low- and mod-
erate-income housing, much of it multi-family, is colliding with local
prejudices against such housing and its occupants even when the
housing is developed by private sponsors.
B. Labor
Construction wages have risen more rapidly than manufacturing
wages. The Nixon Administration claims that the continuation of
recent construction wage settlements "probably would add $2,500 or
more to the cost of constructing a new home" by 1973.21
Contruction wage settlements are the product of collective agree-
ments arrived at locally in federally-assisted construction, including
most federally assisted housing. The Davis-Bacon Act represents a
national policy to pay "prevailing" wages (i.e., union wages) in the
local area as determined by the U.S. Department of Labor.
20. See note 16 at 1, 13.
21. Id. at 18.
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The President in February 197122 suspended the operation of the
Davis-Bacon Act in a vain effort to stem rising construction wages.
This was a highly centralized decision aimed at one sector of the
economy. That centralized intervention, now pale in comparison to
the wage-price freeze announced six months later, was frustrated in
large part by the "little Davis-Bacon Acts" of various states. They
represented an interesting example of federal initiative blunted by a
"residual federalism."
A similar example is the failure of "hometown" plans to ensure
equal employment opportunity in the construction industry. One
observer has reported that the vast majority of the voluntary plans
are in "various stages of neglect, disrepair, failure or, where new,
promise." As of August 1971. the Labor Department had ordered 73
cities to draw up voluntary local hiring plans and had approved vol-
untary plans for 36 cities, including St. Louis which joined five other
major cities setting a federally-imposed minority hiring plan.23
The housing industry is thus beginning to see a far greater inter-
vention by the national government in labor-management relations,
particularly in the unionized sector. This may omit much single-
family home building.
C. Land
The availability of land for housing is only indirectly affected by
federal government action insofar as real estate changing hands may
expose enhanced values to income taxation. The National Commis-
sion on Urban Problems suggested that in 1967, approximately $72
billion worth of real estate changed hands, involving $24 billion in
capital gains, perhaps S15 to $20 billion attributable to land. Such
transfers yielded small tax receipts, around $1 billion, according to
the Commission. 24 There is an effective exemption even under the
lower capital gains tax for the sale of most owner-occupied homes.
The total impact of these policies probably encourages the speculative
retention of land holding.
The federally assisted urban renewal program and a fledgling new
towns program are the only other federal government programs help-
ing to make available land for housing. In the case of urban renewal,
22. Id.
23. URBAN RESEARCH CORP,, URBAN READ-OUT (Chicago, August 25, 1971).
24. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING TnE AmER1OAN
CITY, H.R. Doc. 91-34, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969).
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critics have questioned whether its net effect has not been to remove
needed housing from the national housing inventory. The federal
highway program has also had a distinctly destructive effect on hous-
ing.
In any event, federal policies have had an indirectly neutral to neg-
ative effect on land development for residential use, especially for
lower income people who have not had the advantage of the home-
ownership income tax deductions for mortgage interest payments and
local real estate taxes. As the President observed, "[T]he one major
element in housing costs that federal policy has not addressed effec-
tively to date is the cost of land."25
By contrast, state and local levels of government have exercised
massive controls over the use of land and its taxation. Zoning, sub-
division controls, bedroom-count limitations, and ad valorem real
estate taxes are all critical factors affecting the availability of land for
social purposes over which the central government exercises little or
no control. We do not have a national land use policy, and without
it we cannot have a national urban growth policy.
The cost of land for socially necessary and desirable uses is rising
at an alarming rate. The price per square foot of land used as sites
for new houses purchased with FHA-insured mortgages has increased
at an annual rate of almost 12 per cent from 1965 to 1970.20 The only
feasible way to deal with this problem is some form of land ranking
financed or operated in part by the federal government.27 In the ab-
sence of a national policy it is likely that local and state governments
will be unwilling or unable to act.
The absence of creative local action is not as damaging as local
action which frustrates already established national policy. The im-
pact of national housing goals on local policies of excluding minority
groups, lower-income groups, or multi-family housing has been the
source of concern to those interested in developing more efficient
means of producing housing in the face of rising costs. Thus, the
President observed in his 1969 housing goals report:
The fact remains that it is difficult, if not impossible in many
communities, to find sites for low- and moderate-income housing
because the occupants will be poor, or will be members of a racial
25. See note 16 at 19.
26. 14d.
27. See Franklin, Federal Power and Subsidized Housing, 3 Tur I'aJ3AN LAW-
YER 61 (1971).
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minority, or both. The consequence is that either no low or
moderate income housing is built or that it is built only in the
inner city, thus heightening the tendency for racial polarity in
our society. - s
This comment, which appeared under the "land" section of the second
report, appeared nowhere in the third report.
The gap may be explained by contemporaneous work on a singular
Presidential statement on June 11, 1971, on "Federal Policies Relative
to Equal Housing Opportunity."2 9 An incipient effort in 1970 by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to overcome local
exclusionary land use controls by new central government authority,
premised on a concern with the frustration of its efforts to promote
industrialized housing, ° was effectively quashed by the President in
1971.
The President's formal statement followed a series of blunt although
somewhat unclear pronouncements opposing "forced integration of
the suburbs."'31 His ultimate formal statement 32 explicitly denied any
intention of increasing federal influence on local land policies and
was at pains to explain the limited role of the national government
in housing. A few excerpts will give this flavor of the statement:
My purpose is not to announce new policies, but to define and
explain the policies we have.... The federal government operates
in important but limited ways and under limited authorities.
In terms of site selection for a housing development, the federal
role is one of agreeing or not agreeing to provide subsidies for
projects proposed by local authorities or other developers.
28. PRESIDENT'S SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL HOUSING GOALs, H.R.
Doec. No. 292, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
29. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 14, 1971, at 892.
30. In 1970 George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
proposed enactment of a federal law that would bar local governments from using
zoning, building codes, and other powers to prevent construction of low-income
housing in areas undergoing development. In testimony supporting the proposal,
the Secretary stated, "Adoption of this provision is a necessary first step in ending
the ominous trend toward stratification of our society by race and by income."
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
31. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, December 14, 1970, at 1653;
id., January 11, 1971, at 36; id., February 22, 1971, at 239-240; id., March 29,
1971, at 533. The biting edge of the President's personal attitude was honed down
somewhat by his formal statement.
32. See note 29 supra.
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A municipality that does not want federally assisted housing
should not have it imposed from Washington by bureaucratic fiat;
this is not a proper federal role.
The federal program role-as the governing statutes make clear-
is essentially one of responding to local or private initiatives rather
than one of imposing its programs on state and local governments.
In none of HUD's grant programs does the Department act di-
rectly. The Department builds no housing, develops no landuse
plans, clears no slums and constructs no sewers ....
This Administration will not attempt to impose federally assisted
housing upon any community.
he kinds of land use questions involved in housing site selec-
tion are essentially local in nature-they represent the kind of
basic choices about the future shape of a community, or of a met-
ropolitan area, that should be chiefly for the people of that com-
munity or that area to determine. The challenge of how to pro-
vide fair, open and adequate housing is one that they must meet,
and they must live with their success or failure.
We are dealing here in a realm in which federal authority, while
substantial in terms of enforcement, is very limited in terms of the
choices that must be made in each community.
There are some who assume that the federal government has the
power to do anything it wants-or that they want. But we have
maintained our freedom for nearly two centuries by insisting that
the federal government's exercise of power not exceed its au-
thority.
I believe in that principle, and because the authority of the federal
agencies is limited-quite properly I believe-with respect to the
essentially local and individual choices involved in local com-
munity planning, their power will be used in only limited ways.
The quoted excerpts from the President's statement reflect a tradi-
tional resistance to any articulated national role in shaping metro-
politan America. Returning to the earlier distinction between func-
tional and territorial policies, the former have profound but usually
unarticulated effects on patterns of urban growth whereas the contro-
versy surrounding the latter policies will reflect articulations of con-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1972/iss1/3
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flicting or competing goals. Thus, it is common for national policy-
makers to eschew making choices in this difficult area, for when the
federal writ on the patterns of metropolitan growth is made explicit,
it is challenged as violating the "federal system."
Some observers believe that these contradictions could be avoided
by converting our current housing construction subsidy programs,
which stimulate supply, into a "housing allowance" system which
"subsidizes people" who would then seek their shelter on the same
basis as anyone else. Such an approach would supposedly absolve the
national government of the responsibility to make any choice regard-
ing metropolitan patterns of settlement, more or less as revenue shar-
ing is supposed to do in other contexts.
This is not the place to analyze housing allowances other than to
say that local land use and building controls that inflate housing costs
and otherwise frustrate the provision of an adequate supply will con-
tinue to exert the same negative influence with any likely housing
allowance system.
IV. A NEW FEDERAL ROLE
The foregoing discussion has sketeched the pervasive national in-
fluence over what might be described as the economic aspects of urban
growth and its professed neutrality on the quality and character of
urban growth. In the latter regard, the national government has
been a facilitator of decisions made without reference to even a gen-
eralized notion of how we might better organize our urban environ-
ment. Perhaps only the urban renewal program might be a significant
exception, since it was initially based on the political conviction that
the vitality of the central city must be maintained. In this connection,
it should be noted that the increasing concern with the program's
destruction of low-income housing led to pressures on the national
government to make low- and moderate-income housing a favored
reuse of urban renewal land. This change, however slow and limited,
would have taken far longer and been far less effective had local
officials been the only pressure points for change.
Clearly the time has come to examine whether this professed neu-
trality or refusal to articulate refined goals of national policy helps us
to think clearly and to act beneficially on urban growth issues.
Did the President correctly describe the real role of the federal
government in housing? His statement may have been so "lawyerly"
as to mislead us as to what actually happens in the day to day inter-
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action between federal officialdom and local officialdom and private
citizens.
For example, the local HUD area office, which the President would
describe as "essentially ... responding to local or private initiatives
....." actually exercises influence over the location and design of hous-
ing sites, which sponsors will be favored, and which projects will suffer
vexatious delay. Under policies announced by HUD in June 1971, 31
a proposed housing project, including public housing and FHA hous-
ing, would be rated "superior" if it is outside an area of minority
concentration. If a project does not rate at least "adequate" on the
nondiscriminatory location criteria, it would be disapproved. These
criteria, although vague, and striving to make objective a process of
judgment which remains subjective, nevertheless demonstrate the in-
fluence on sites which has always been exerted by officials who receive
their pay on U.S. Treasury checks.
A U.S. Appeals Court, in Gautreaux v. Romney,34 pointed out that
the federal role in correcting the past discriminatory policy of the
Chicago Housing Authority was as "equally important" as CHA's own
role.
Within the structure of the housing programs as funded, HUD
retained a large amount of discretion to approve or reject both
site selection and tenant assignment procedures of the local hous-
ing authority. HUD's 'annual contributions contract' contained
detailed provisions concerning program operations and was ac-
companied by eight pages of regulations on the subject of site
selection alone.35
33. See note 14 supra.
34. 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
35. Id. at 739. On September 16, 1971, Senators Brooke and Mondale an-
nounced amendments to existing and proposed housing legislation which would
express the intent of Congress that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment should act as houser of last resort in those areas of the country where a
"housing emergency" exists. A "housing emergency" would be defined as a sub-
stantial number of low and moderate families residing or employed in an area
where there are no sponsors (public or private) willing to provide housing to meet
their needs. This section would further provide that the Secretary of HUD, by
contract with private or public agencies or other entities may act as sponsor in
such areas beginning two years after the enactment of this act. Further, Secretary
of HUD would submit to Congress within one year his plans for implementing
this section including his proposed criteria to identify such "emergency" housing
areas. This concept is included in the 1970 Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4601.
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The court's holding was based on its conclusion that HUD's past
actions were racially discriminatory "in their own right" and not just
on the theory of joint participation with the local agency.
In reality, and as recognized by courts if not by statutes, the federal
government does play a direct and significant role in the financing
and the location of subsidized housing in every locality where projects
are located under the existing system. It is the locality where projects
should be developed, but are not because of local inaction or obstruc-
tionism, that federal power has yet to reach. To deal with this situa-
tion the national government will need to become the "houser of last
resort."
This idea, in some minds, may mean the revival of federal eminent
domain and sponsorship powers which the federal government exer-
cised under the National Industrial Recovery Act until a federal dis-
trict court ruled such activity unconstitutional in United States v.
Certain Lands in Louisville.36
The National Commission on Urban Problems (The Douglas Com-
mission), in recommending the idea in 1968, stated:
If both a locality within a state, and the state itself, fail in their
responsibilities to help meet the present crisis in the supply of
housing for low-income Americans, the Commission believes that
the Congress should authorize an emergency low-income housing
program under which the Department of HUD would, as a direct
federal operation equipped with the powers of eminent domain,
build and have ready for occupancy such portion of 500,000 low-
income units a year remains unmet by local and state action.37
A variant of this basic idea proposed by the President's Committee
on Urban Housing3s recommended direct federal acquisition of land,
leases for the development of subsidized housing, and federal pre-
emption of building and land use regulations on such sites as well as
others which would not be federally acquired but on which housing
was to be federally subsidized.
It is interesting to note that the Louisville decision recognized the
implicit grant under the fifth amendment of eminent domain powers
to the United States for "public use" of the property acquired. The
court, however, declined to extend the "public use" concept to the
36. 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 735 (1936).
37. See note 24 supra at 192.
38. PRESMENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HomE 25-26
(1968).
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public construction and operation of low-income housing. It rejected
as untenable a conception of "public use" as meaning "public benefit,
public advantage, [or] general welfare." 39 This is, of course, an old
debate which has lost much of its vitality.
Charles Abrams has reminded us that only the legalisms of the
Louisville decision destroyed the new political federalism implicit in
the NIRA low-income housing program. The United States had set
up TVA and a "greenbelt" new towns program as direct federal plan-
ning and development activities with the power of eminent domain,
along with the NIRA housing program. None of these three federal
ventures into formerly sanctified state prerogatives met significant
political opposition even on the local scene. By 1936, under the um-
brella of the general welfare clause, "a formula had been carved out
of the necessities of the era under which the federal government had
assumed the initiative and responsibility for rebuilding urban and
suburban America,"40 only to be destroyed by judicial support of a
stubborn landowner in Louisville.
This case, by frustrating the NIRA housing effort, led directly to
the system established under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937,41 under
which the eminent domain power for low-income public housing is
exercised by state agencies funded by the federal government. It is
ironic that the eminent domain authority of such state agencies, ac-
tually local housing authorities, and later urban renewal agencies, was
challenged under legal theories identical to those asserted against the
United States in the Louisville case, except that the fourteenth amend-
ment and the state constitutions were the basis of attack. All these
attacks were unsuccessful. Thus, whatever claim to authority could
have been asserted for the Louisville rationale has long since been
eroded in the state courts.
39. 9 F. Supp. at 138.
40. Abrams, The Legal Basis for Reorganizing Metropolitan Areas in a Frec So-
ciety, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF Am. PHIL. Soc. 177 (1962). Governors and mayors wel-
comed PWA projects into their jurisdictions and many states and local authorities
(who managed the projects after the federal agency developed them) filed
Supreme Court amicus briefs in support of the federal program in the Louisville
case. The "greenbelt" new towns program fared no better in the lower federal
courts. After the decentralization of the program became a legislative fact, the
Supreme Court upheld federally aided housing as a valid public purpose. City of
Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
41. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, § 1, 50 Stat. 888.
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The system we have inherited can be described as institutionalized
discrimination against the poor. The transmission belt for federal
housing assistance operates principally through an underwriting of
the home finance system. The poor, however, are legatees of the Louis-
vile rationale, and must depend on local affirmative public action to
obtain federal housing assistance. Thus in the absence of strong na-
tional policy, localities can confine the poor and minority groups to
the central city or refuse to aid those who are residents.
This can be illustrated by supposing oneself to be a suburban mayor
who wishes to deny federal housing subsidies to poor, often black, resi-
dents, or potential residents, of his jurisdiction.
1. The first non-action would be to fail to create a local housing
authority. Although such authorities are state agencies, they must be
activated by local governing body action. The failure to create an
authority, or to consent to the operation of a neighboring authority,
effectively precludes the introduction of low-rent public housing into
the jurisdiction. There is no federal authority to sponsor such housing
directly.
2. If pressure to create an authority is too intense, or one has previ-
ously been created, a second defense would be appointing members of
the authority who will see that it takes no action on local or regional
housing problems. Two of the five members usually suffice to see that
nothing happens, even in the unusual case where the authority staff
wishes to act imaginatively and constructively.
3. Where, against all odds, the authority is willing and capable of
moving affirmatively, the mayor and council can frustrate it by dedin-
ing to approve a "cooperation agreement," which is a condition to
federal financing. Such an agreement pledges the extension of munci-
pal services to the completed project, and other actions necessary to
permit completion.
4. Quite apart from actions by a local housing authority, local re-
fusal to approve leased housing transactions or rent supplement con-
tracts can stymnie other public or private efforts to transmit federal
housing subsidies to the poor.
5. When all else fails, or added potential for inaction is needed, put
the provision of low-income housing to a referendum.
Under the existing system, an added bias against the poor results
from the fact that, generally, low-income public housing is not subject
to local real estate taxes. Such projects make payments in lieu of taxes
which usually fall far short of what local government would expect
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
from a privately-owned development of similar cost and design. By
contrast, when the non-poor receive federal benefits to improve their
housing, localities do not make a contribution to this benefit in the
form of foregone tax recipts. All FHA subsidized housing is on the
tax rolls (except in some high cost localities where a form of tax
abatement is necessary for project feasibility). Thus, political diffi-
culties for subsidizing housing generally are compounded in the cases
of low-income public housing.
Were such projects to lose their tax-exempt status or were federal
resources to defray the cost of full local real estate taxes, what would
remain of the rationale of requiring a locality to approve public hous-
ing?42 Such local governing body approval is required only for public
housing and rent supplements in private housing, the only two fed-
erally-aided housing programs for the poor but financed in two differ-
ent ways.43
This perverse symmetry illustrates the extent to which Congress has
seen fit to fetter the basic functional financing mechanisms of FHA
with a local public veto power only in the case where the poor might
have something to gain from those functional policies. Consequently,
the removal of this local public veto for rent supplement housing and
public housing once it goes onto the tax rolls can be regarded as the
first step to "freeing up" a functional approach to housing subsidies.
It does fall far short, however, of placing national housing policy into
the context of urban growth policy.
Shall we rely only on local initiatives to create local housing author-
ities, or to activate them? Shall we rely on this financing mechanism
in any event? Should we depend on the private strategies or acci-
dental opportunities of private (profit and nonprofit) groups to
42. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971), does not preclude the federal government from eliminating the local
approval requirements for subsidized housing. Indeed, footnote 4 of the Court's
opinion suggests that the rationale for the current requirement is the fact that
public housing may not pay full real estate taxes. In rejecting the supremacy
clause argument in the case, Justice Black observed for the 5 to 3 majority, "By
the Housing Act of 1937 the Federal Government has offered aid to state and
local governments for the creation of low-rent public housing. However, the
federal legislation does not purport to require that local governments accept this
or to outlaw local referendums on whether the aid should be accepted." Id. at 140.
43. For an analysis of litigation strategies to require local affirmative action on
public housing see Roisman, The Right to Public Housing, 39 Gno. WAsHr. L.
Rnv. 691 (1971).
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determine where and when subsidized housing will be located?
The Congress has just begun to ask some of these questions in eval-
uating Title V of the proposed Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1971.44 This title would encourage the creation of metropolitan
housing agencies to program, but not develop, subsidized housing in
metropolitan areas. The title is very complex; generally it would pro-
vide incentives to metropolitan housing plans and deny community
development subsidies to localities that did not participate in the
planning process. It is not clear if the title will do more than provide
a metropolitan layer of consent to subsidized housing without ade-
quately increasing the pressures on localities to give their consent to
individual projects.
But it does move in the essential direction of stimulating a metro-
politan planning process. It is interesting, and perhaps ironic, to note
that although the Democratic Party tends to see the importance of
national planning, Title V introduced under Democratic auspices
places the responsibilities for metropolitan planning in a non-federal
agency. By ironic contrast, the Republican Administration, despite a
rhetoric of decentralization, has announced federal housing site loca-
tion policies that suggest the focus of metropolitan planning responsi-
bilities might be more appropriately placed, ultimately, in federal
hands. So long as there is power in a national agency to approve and
carry out such a plan, who draws it up is a subsidiary question.
Accordingly, the second major ingredient of a "last resort" mech-
anism must be some kind of metropolitan planning process to ration-
alize any national policy of directly placing housing in a recalcitrant
community. If such a planning process does not exist, regardless
whether it is done under federal or non-federal auspices, the national
government exercising "last resort" powers may be open to the charge
of acting arbitrarily or simply aiding private opportunities to develop
land in metropolitan areas.
If a metropolitan housing plan is drawn up, the national govern-
ment ought to have the power to finance housing sponsored by others,
carry out the plan, acquire land for this purpose, lease it to other
sponsors, or develop the housing itself. All of these powers should be
untrammeled by local land use and building regulations.
In summary, our current housing policies do not serve the most
pressing urban growth objective of overcoming economic and racial
44. H.R. 9688, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971).
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disparities in metropolitan areas. They serve the non-poor through
functional policies and the poor through area development policies
that are not related to any urban growth policy. The major missing
ingredients are the elimination of local veto over subsidized housing
within a context of metropolitan planning and a strong national power
to implement those plans when other levels of government or the
private sector will not or cannot do so.
Undoubtedly the power of Congress to deal with the nation's racial
problems in metropolitan areas is the rationale for federal power in
the 1970's to confront directly what other levels of government choose
to evade.
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